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EFFECTIVE CORRECTION OF JAPAN'S ANTIMONOPOLY
POLICY?
MARK K. MORITA*
1. INTRODUCTION
The Japanese market is rigged, I'm telling you. The son of a
bitch is rigged! It's rigged!
-Lee Iacocca.'
The widening trade deficit and the perceived or actual impenetra-
bility of the Japanese market have led to public outcry among Ameri-
can businesspersons and politicians.2 In response to this outcry, the
United States has attempted to correct these problems by negotiating
changes in the internal structures and policies of both trading partners'
political and legal systems.' The trade negotiations between Japan and
the United States have resulted in the Joint Report of the United
States-Japan Working Group on the Structural Impediments Initiative
(SII). 4 SII contains agreements in principle and detailed commitments
* J.D. Candidate 1992, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. 1976 New
York University. For my grandmother, Mrs. Kamata Miyahira, on her 100th birthday,
May 1, 1992.
1 Playboy Interview: Lee Iacocca, PLAYBOY, Jan. 1991, at 55, 66 (Iacocca ex-
plained that as the dollar devalued relative to the yen he was able to increase sales in
Korea and Taiwan by 5,000 units each and to bring sales up to 50,000 units in Eu-
rope. Logically, sales in Japan should have increased similarly, however, they only rose
by a thousand units.).
2 See America, You Lost the Economic War!, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1990, at B2
(An advertisement by Boone Co.) (The advertisement asserts that American industry is
losing the economic war because Japanese corporations are able to take advantage of
the open American markets but refuse to give American corporations access to their
markets. The advertisement further alleges these unfair practices: 1) Koito Manufac-
turing, a company allegedly in Toyota's keiretsu (supply cartel), denies an American
investment company with a 26% ownership interest in Koito a seat on the board of
directors but allows Toyota, a 19% owner, three such seats; 2) Japanese direct invest-
ment in the United States totals $32.5 billion, but the United States is restricted to $1.6
billion direct investment in Japan; 3) Japanese companies are "exporting their cartel-
like keiretsus to America, in violation of U.S. antitrust laws.").
3 See W. H. COOPER, JAPAN-U.S. TRADE: THE STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS IN-
rrIATIVE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Sept. 15, 1990, at ORS-1 (This observer believes
that the Initiative goes beyond the previous negotiations that dealt with overt barriers
such as "import quotas, high tariffs, and government regulations.").
' JOINT REPORT OF THE U.S.-JAPAN WORKING GROUP ON THE STRUCTURAL
IMPEDIMENTS INITIATIVE, June 28, 1990 [hereinafter SI]. See also Hearing of the
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which the United States hopes will significantly reduce its $49 billion
trade deficit with Japan.5 The SII dialogue, which continued through-
out 1991,6 has presently identified six Japanese and seven American
market impediments which the two countries have each agreed must be
corrected.' The impediments are interrelated and have varying degrees
of effect on the creation of the trade imbalance. This comment will
analyze Japan's agreements on the keiretsua and Exclusionary Business
Practices.9 The analysis will focus on the effects of these economic phe-
nomena on the Japanese market from the perspective of the formation
and operation of postwar Japanese private industry, the Japanese gov-
ernment's enforcement of anti-monopoly laws and its promulgation of
national industrial policy. This comment will begin this analysis by
first discussing the problems confronting Western businesses doing bus-
iness in Japan and explaining the regulatory practices and laws relat-
ing to these problems. Following this, there will be an examination of
SIH agreements and the sections of the Japanese Antimonopoly Act that
are relevant to the keiretsu or cartel problems and the possible obstacles
to attaining SIT's goals. This comment will conclude by presenting ef-
fective solutions which should be incorporated into the continuing SIT
dialogue.
2. MOTIVATION FOR THE PROMULGATION OF SIT
The proponents of SII have articulated their commitment to
achieving "more efficient, open and competitive markets, promot[ing]
sustained economic growth and enhanc[ing] the quality of life in both
Japan and the United States."'" United States Trade Representative
International Trade Subcommittee of the Senate Finance Committee, Fed. News Serv.,
Mar. 5, 1990 at Commerce and Trade [hereinafter Hearing] (witness S. Linn Wil-
liams, Deputy United States Trade Representative (USTR), stating that SII is a
unique, iterative bilateral negotiation between sovereign governments with no set pat-
terns or benchmarks, and with each nation responsible for its own competitiveness.).
6 U.S.-Japan Trade Talks, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1990, at D19, col. 4.
e Id.
' COOPER, supra note 3, at CRS-1.
S I1, supra note 4, at § V. The term keiretsu in Japan specifically refers to
groupings of companies tied together either by cross-shareholding or by financial obli-
gations. Some of the keiretsu have origins in pre-World War II family-owned corporate
combines called zaibatsu, but others were created after the war usually with a bank as
the principal institution. The definition of the term keiretsu in western usage has come
to include cartels or cartel-like practices. This paper will use this current definition
and, for the purposes of this paper, will draw only minor distinctions between the
keiretsu and cartel.
9 Id. at § IV.
10 Id. at 1; see also Kanabayashi & Brauchli, Rebuilding Japan Prompted by the
U.S., Tokyo Slates Trillions in Domestic Spending, Wall St. J., Jan. 3, 1991, at Al,
col. 1 (The article asserts that the increase in Japanese public spending required by SII
[Vol. 12:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol12/iss4/9
STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS
(USTR) Carla Hills believes that the substantial markets which are
presently closed could provide "alternative engines for growth" that
would ultimately have global benefits by expanding trade and fostering
economic growth.11 An additional benefit may accrue if the elimination
of trade restrictions from the Japanese market does in fact curtail the
build up of anti-Japan sentiment. The participants in these talks hope
to actualize these goals by creating a "parity of opportunity" - provid-
ing the same opportunities in Japan that the Japanese enjoy in the rest
of the world." USTR Hills maintains that these SII policies, which
attack the keiretsu and other barriers to the Japanese market, will ben-
efit the Japanese economy and its consumers. Hills believes that indi-
vidual Japanese consumers and at least eighty percent of the Japanese
business community also support these policies.' If her belief is correct
will result in overall improvement in the country's infrastructure, including roads, rail-
roads, and sewage treatment. The improvements should not only benefit the general
populace, but will have the serendipitous benefit of increasing Japan's competitiveness.
This side effect will occur because the appropriations will avoid Japan's pork-barrel
politics which have provided well in some areas of the country but left other areas like
"less-developed countries." The article also characterizes previous attempts by Wash-
ington to solve the trade imbalance as benefitting Japan more than the United States.
In one case, "when Japanese semiconductor makers were slashing prices to win market
share, the U.S. extracted an agreement that in effect put a floor under chip prices; but
since many U.S. chip makers had already lost their markets, the benefit of supported
prices mainly flowed back to Japan." A second case occurred "when the U.S.... began
fighting its trade deficit by letting the dollar depreciate, the stronger yen gave Japanese
companies the ability to gobble up American assets cheaply.").
11 Remarks of Ambassador Carla Hills, US Trade Representative to the Institute
of International Economics Conference on GATT, Fed. News Serv., June 25, 1990, at
Commerce and Trade.
1' Id. (USTR Hills stating, "[a]nd if that parity of opportunity is not given, I'm
afraid that the protectionist forces will tend to raise barriers and again create imperfec-
tions in our multilateral trading system.").
1S Id. See also Hearing of the Economic and Commercial Law Subcommittee of
the House Judiciary Committee, Fed. News Serv., May 3, 1990, at Commerce and
Trade [hereinafter Hearing May 3] (testimony of witness Mr. X, an anonymous Japa-
nese businessman who operates a medium sized company supplying parts to an auto
manufacturer as part of a keiretsu. Mr. X appeals for American political pressure to
break up the closed markets in Japan.); Hearing of the Asian and Pacific Subcommit-
tee and the International Economic Policy and Trade Subcommittee of the House For-
ein Affairs Committee, Fed. News Serv., Apr. 19, 1990, at Commerce and Trade
[hereinafter Hearing Apr. 191 (Under Secretary of State for Economic and Agricul-
tural Affairs Richard T. McCormack stating,
Yomiuri News, in a commentary entitled, 'Why Couldn't We Resolve
These Matters Earlier?,' why the Japanese government moved on SII
only when pushed strongly by the US, even though most of the US sug-
gestions were on target and exactly what Japan should be doing on its
own. Similarly, Nikkei editorialized that, quote, 'US requests better repre-
sented the interests consumers and urbanites than did Japan and every
political party.').
But see Playboy Interview: Shintaro Ishihara, PLAYBOY, Oct. 1990, at 59, 63 (Mr.
Ishihara, author of THE JAPAN THAT CAN'T SAY No, maintains that much of the
1991]
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and SII can maintain public support, the remaining obstacles to SII
implementation should be minimal. History and politics, however, pro-
vide little optimism for a successful voluntary elimination of the struc-
tural impediments to an open Japanese market.
2.1. Keiretsu and Exclusionary Business Practices
2.1.1. Keiretsu
The Japanese look with approval upon the formation of keiretsu,
or business cartels. Japan's Fair Trade Commission's (JFTC) findings
during the period from 1972 to 1976 indicated the prevalence of
keirestu activity in Japan: "out of one hundred leading manufacturing
and mining companies, forty-five [were] respondents in at least one car-
tel decision, thirty-two were respondents in at least two cartel decisions,
twenty-four in more than three decisions, and twelve in more than five
decisions. '14 Such "legal" cartels are formed with JFTC approval, cre-
ated by legislative order, or permitted to exist due to Japan's lax anti-
trust enforcement.
The American government has identified the inadequacy of Ja-
pan's antitrust enforcement and the legality of certain types of cartels as
major factors in the success of Japan's export efforts.15 These public
sector-based problems are' compounded by private sector problems:
"U.S. officials argue that Japanese business practices fence U.S. com-
panies out of the market while allowing Japanese firms to charge high
prices and build resources for export battles in America."'" Japanese
business leaders, seeking to refute this contention, have maintained that
the keiretsu do not purposely close the markets to imports and explain
that "if keiretsu were anti-competitive, [they] would raise prices and be
deserted by consumers."1 Despite the denial of any intent to close the
resentment against Japan's economic success is based on racism: "the fact that a non-
white race is catching up with the Americans and taking over the lead in advanced
technology, is intolerable to Americans." He also believes that the opening of the Japa-
nese market will not resolve the trade imbalance.).
14 Sanekata, Antitrust in Japan: Recent Trends and Their Socio-Political Back-
ground, 20 U. BRIT. COLuM. L. REV. 379, 393 (1986).
'5 Fugate, Antitrust Aspects of U.S.-Japanese Trade, 15 CASE W. RS. INT'L L.
505, 524 (1983).
16 Hiatt, Japan Preparing Array of Trade Concessions, Wash. Post, Mar. 20,
1990, at C1, col. 2, C4, col. 3.
17 s1I Talks: Now for the Hard Part, Jiji Press Ticker Serv., Apr. 20, 1990. But
see Hiroshi, Antitrust and Industrial Policy in Japan: Competition and Cooperation,
in LAW AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 56, 60 (Saxonhouse &
Yamamura eds. 1986) (maintaining that government has allowed policies which restrict
rather than promote competition); Note, Trustbusting in Japan: Cartels and Govern-
ment-Business Cooperation, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1064, 1073-74 (1981) [hereinafter
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market, the traditional practice of buying from long-standing Japanese
suppliers in the context of preferential trading relationships has had the
effect of eliminating foreign goods from Japan's market.18 The keiretsu
enable trading partners to pay above market prices for the other's
materials, thereby rendering official formal protection from cheaper im-
ports unnecessary."
While vertical restraints of trade, such as exclusive dealing and
territorial restrictions on dealers, are supposedly prohibited when such
practices obstruct fair competition,2  Japan regularly uses these tech-
niques to realize its industrial policy.2 Until the first JFTC investiga-
tions in 1985, exclusive dealing and territorial restrictions had been es-
tablished practices of the "distribution networks of manufacturers in
oligopolistic industries such as automobiles and electrical appliances.1
22
The government had actively promoted the restrictive distribution con-
tracts of these networks to increase efficient distribution. 3 The practice
is still deeply rooted in the Japanese system, causing detrimental effects
to consumers, the companies subservient to the keiretsu parent, and
other companies attempting to enter the market.
24
The United States argues that the keiretsu have the effect of re-
stricting imports into Japan.25 Conversely, the Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry (MITI) claims that the cartels actually in-
crease imports by curtailing production, thereby raising Japanese prices
and giving imported goods competitive advantages.2" These apparent
Note] (MITI's cartelization policy during the 1960s had several adverse consequences,
including price inflation, for consumers and those businesses outside MITI's pro-
grams.); Playboy Interview: Shintaro Ishihara, supra note 13, at 66 (The interview
supports the proposition that Japan should open its market for the good of the Japa-
nese consumer. Ishihara cites a study showing that costs are 40% higher in Tokyo than
in New York and asserting that most products would be cheaper and of higher quality
in a free market.).
18 Hearing of the Joint Economic Committee, Fed. News Serv., Oct. 11, 1989, at
Commerce and Trade [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of Ray Ahearn, Trade Rela-
tions Specialist, Congressional Research Service).
" Id. (Mr. Ahearn stating that intergroup trading can account for 20 to 30% of
total sales for some group members.).
" Sanekata, supra note 14, at 381.
21 Id.
21 Id. at 383.
2S Id. (The JFTC challenged these practices only in response to increased pres-
sure from domestic consumers and international concerns.).
" See Hearing May 3, supra note 13 (testimony of Mr. X explaining that
keiretsu kickbacks, exclusionary agreements and price manipulation hurt everyone ex-
cept the keiretsu parent.).
25 Tanaka & Middleton, Injured Industries, Imports and Industrial Policy: A
Comparison of United States and Japanese Practices, 15 CAsE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
419 (1983).
26 Id.
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advantages are illusory, however, as the preferential arrangements in
Japan's business and government practices prevent foreign companies
from entering the market and profitting from the price disparity. These
practices have the additional consequence of permitting Japanese com-
panies to charge higher prices at home than abroad.17 Some observers
have noted that if the Japanese market were truly free, companies
could practice arbitrage, buying the goods abroad at a cheaper price
and reselling them in Japan at the higher price, however, the "barriers
to arbitrage . . . [provide] implicit evidence that the market remains
closed . 28
These practices also directly impact the American domestic econ-
omy because Japanese manufacturers limit their American business to
their keiretsu-related American-based branches. In the words of one
prominent American businessperson addressing the dangers of the
keiretsu: "[b]usting Japan's trusts is essential to free trade but with
more and more Japanese investment in the United States it is critical to
the preservation of our own free enterprise system of open competi-
tion." 29 Along these lines, a United States Department of Commerce
report states: "[c]urrent US suppliers to Japanese companies manufac-
turing in the United States have been told that they will no longer be a
supplier once traditional Japanese suppliers have located in this coun-
try .... [or the American suppliers will be] forced into a joint venture
with the traditional Japanese supplier in order to obtain transplant
contracts."' o
Trade statistics manifest the comparatively excessive extent to
which Japanese firms control Japanese international trade. 1 In 1986,
American companies shipped 37% of all exports entering Europe while
European companies controlled approximately 30% of Europe's exports
to the United States. By contrast, American firms controlled only 14%
of American exports to Japan,"2 while Japanese affiliated firms con-
trolled 60% of the American exports to Japan." This exportation of
27 Hearing, supra note 18 (testimony of Mr. Robert Lawrence, Senior Fellow,
Brookings Institute, stating that structural impediments prevent foreign corporations
from practicing arbitrage with Japanese goods.).
28 Id. (testimony of Mr. Ahearn, Trade Relations Specialist, Congressional Re-
search Service.).
29 Senate and American Business Debate Whether SI1 is Enough, Kyodo News
Serv., Nov. 7, 1989.
10 Hearing May 3, supra note 13 (Julian C. Morris, President, Automotive Parts
& Accessories Association, Inc., quoting a Department of Commerce report on Japa-
nese trade practices.).
SI Hearing, supra note 18 (testimony of Mr. Robert Lawrence, Senior Fellow,
Brookings Institute, citing 1986 statistics.).
32 Id.
33 Id.
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the keiretsu or keiretsu practices can be expected to decrease competi-
tive market procedures in the United States.
2.1.2. Japan's Restrictive Trade Practices
Having examined some of the macroeconomic implications of the
Japanese practice of protecting domestic industries by fostering the
keiretsu and using import restrictions to exclude foreign corporations,
this comment will now examine how this policy adversely effects the
Japanese consumer. 4 As previously noted, the Japanese government
has often restricted foreign access to its markets. The Japanese have
proffered feeble justifications for such exclusions, claiming that the con-
ditions in Japan are so uniquely Japanese that only Japanese firms are
qualified to provide the product or service at issue. For example, Amer-
ican companies were not allowed to bid on the construction of Kansai
International Airport's foundation because the soil and water conditions
in Osaka Bay were uniquely Japanese; foreign-made skis were barred
because the Japanese snow was unique; and foreign-produced beef was
restricted because the "Japanese people's intestines are different from
other peoples'." 5
Another exclusionary practice, bid-rigging, had been a widespread
and tolerated practice in the public project construction industry. Al-
though the JFTC had outlawed bid-rigging in other industries, the
practice continued unabated in the construction industry until 1982
when the JFTC first took action against construction contract bid-rig-
ging.36 The construction industry's large political contributions had en-
abled it to enlist the support of the majority government party in its
campaign to continue bid-rigging, a practice which it claimed served
the public interest.
3 7
2.1.3. Predatory Pricing and Capturing Market Share
Japan has sought to realize its economic goal - creating a trade
surplus by capturing a dominant market share - by permitting exclu-
sionary business practices and the formation and functioning of
34 Id. (Mr. Lawrence's testimony supports the proposition that the Japanese
manufacturers have great power over the final prices to Japanese consumers. He states
that general consumer products were 38% less expensive in New York City and 30%
cheaper in Paris and Dusseldorf than in most Japanese cities.).
" Blustein, Not Quite Perfect:Japan's New Airport Sinks, Philadelphia Inquirer,
Jan. 3, 1991, at 1-A, col. 3, 4-A, col. 1.
36 Sanekata, supra note 14, at 390.
3 Id. (The construction industry claimed that "because of excessive competition
within the industry the allocation of jobs was indispensable for the survival of small
and medium-sized companies.").
1991]
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keiretsu. These restrictive industrial trade practices and the unique op-
eration of Japanese businesses 8 have led to predatory pricing preva-
lence and acceptability." For a predatory pricing scheme to be effective
the manufacturer must absorb losses from low product prices for a pe-
riod long enough to force a substantial number of competitors out of
business.40 The predator can then recoup its losses by charging above
market prices and realizing a monopolist's profit.41
In Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. ,42 Ameri-
can television manufacturers alleged that 21 Japanese companies had
engaged in a predatory pricing scheme in the consumer electronics mar-
ket. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had conspired to drive
them out of the market by setting artificially low prices in the United
States and by subsidizing these prices with profits gained by charging
artificially high prices in Japan.4 The plaintiffs further asserted that
the price level set for the American market was so low that it caused
the defendants substantial losses44 which would be recouped in the long
run by charging American consumers monopolistic prices following the
elimination of domestic competition.45 The Supreme Court rejected
these claims on the basis that such a plan involving so many competi-
tors would be extremely difficult to maintain. The Court further rea-
soned that it would be irrational for these companies to sustain losses
without a strong guarantee of attaining their goal.46
This holding exemplifies the inability of American antitrust law to
effectively confront the seemingly incomprehensible capabilities of the
Japanese keiretsu. The Court's premise - that predatory pricing was
an irrational scheme that could not be successful and would not be at-
tempted by a rational competitor - was based on the assumption that
a manufacturer could not afford to sustain the practice long enough to
38 See, e.g., id.
Although antitrust laws are designed to increase competitive pricing, a violation
could occur when a company attempts to eliminate other competitors by pricing the
products below market prices.
40 Elzinga, Collusive Predation: Matsushita v. Zenith, in THE ANTrrRUST
REVOLUTION 241, 244 (J. Kwoka, Jr. & L. White eds. 1989).
41 Id. See also Hearing May 3, supra note 13 (Mr. T. Boone Pickens, President,
Boone Co., states that the high prices in Japan are causing the middle class Japanese
consumer to finance the purchase of market share in the United States. The Japanese
will eventually charge the American consumer the same high prices: "the Japanese will
get their pound of flesh back that they paid for when they bought the market share.").
42 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
41 See Case Comment, Judicial Tests to Determine Predatory Pricing Before and
After Matsushita, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 839, 855-56 (citing 475 U.S. at 577-78)
[hereinafter Judicial Tests].
44 Id. at 856 (citing 475 U.S. at 578).
41 Elzinga, supra note 40, at 242-43.
48 Judicial Tests, supra note 43, at 859-60 (citing 475 U.S. at 590-592).
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derive benefits."7 The Court failed to acknowledge that MITI's direc-
tion and control enabled the Japanese firms to maintain the conspir-I
acy.48 The Court's assumption further failed to anticipate the Japanese
government's enormous capacity to subsidize the predatory industries
49
and grant them low interest loans. The Court also failed to comprehend
the industries' ability to recoup such losses by passing the cost on in the
form of above market prices charged to consumers in Japan's closed
markets.5" These factors combined to enable the keiretsu to sustain its
predatory practice long enough to achieve the goal of reducing or elimi-
nating competitors in the American market.
Theoretically, the domestic industry could have returned to pro-
duction once the predator attempted to raise prices above market
levels.51 While, in theory, the price increase should allow the domestic
industries to re-enter the market and drive prices down, in practical
terms this is impossible.52 First, Japan has only employed predatory
pricing to gain market share in industries that require extensive capital
investment and technological research and development - consumer
electronics, semi-conductors" and automobiles. The capital and techno-
logical requirements of such industries necessitate lengthy start up peri-
ods which translate into lags in market re-entry time. During these lags
the predator can recoup its losses by charging monopolistic prices. Sec-
ond, when any competition attempts market re-entry, the Japanese
manufacturers would resume predatory pricing until they had elimi-
nated that challenge to market superiority.5 4 Upon securing superiority,
47 Id. at 862 ("The alleged conspiracy had originated in 1953 and had been in
operation without any hint of success for approximately twenty years.").
48 See Elzinga, supra note 40, at 243-44; Matsushita, Export Control and Export
Cartels in Japan, 20 HARv. INT'L L.J. 103, 121 (reviewing documents detailing
MITI's role in the television price conspiracy.).
'9 Hearing, supra note 18 (Mr. Ahearn testifying that, for Japan "protection and
promotion of manufacturing industries is linked to national survival .... Abroad, the
[goal] is manifested by the longstanding practice of Japanese companies to place top
priority on obtaining market share even at the expense of profits.").
50 Id. (Mr. Ahearn stating that "[h]igh domestic prices allow Japanese companies
to earn substantial profits that can be used to subsidize both research and development
and aggressive export drives .... the high prices are reaped by the windfall profits
accruing to the producers.").
"I See Hearing, supra note 13 (Mr. Pickens states, "somebody says, 'Well, if the
pricing gets too high, then Chrysler puts on another line'-that's not right. That's not
the way it works. Chrysler can't start up a line that quick .... we're going to be
crippled to the point that they can use pricing to their advantage. They did buy a
market share and they're going to get a return, a big return on it.").
52 Id.
53 Ferguson, Computers and the Coming of the U.S. Keiretsu, 68 HARv. Bus.
REv. at 64, 66 July -Aug. 1990.
" Id.
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the Japanese manufacturers would reinstate the price increase.55 Such
behavior occurred, for example, in the semi-conductor industry.56
3. JAPAN'S ANTIMONOPOLY POLICY
Zaibatsu, or government encouraged cartels, dominated the Japa-
nese economy prior to 1945." 7 The zaibatsu were giant manufacturing
combines with origins as merchant or moneylending firms.58 The
zaibatsu consisted of a holding company, generally owned by a wealthy
family, which controlled many subsidiaries and affiliates. 59 After the
war, the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) dismantled the
zaibatsu because SCAP believed that they had contributed to pre-war
Japan's imperialist and expansionist policies.60 This dismantling fur-
ther served the occupational forces by fostering the superimposition of
Western democratic values on the Japanese economic and political
system. 1
In keeping with the attempts to Westernize post-war Japan's eco-
nomic structure and practices, the legislature enacted Japan's An-
timonopoly Law of 1947, which was modeled after, but was more stri-
dent than,62 existing American antitrust law.63 The imposition of
antitrust laws based on the Western individual-centered philosophy
constituted a major departure from the existing Japanese policies
rooted in government-business cooperation.64 Additionally, as the
stigma surrounding the Occupational Forces became publicly attached
to the antitrust legislation, 5 the Japanese government quickly amended
the unsatisfactory policy. Within 15 months of the end of the occupa-
tion, the government had enacted an amendment exempting certain
55 Id.
56 Id.
11 H. IYORI & A. UESUGI, THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS OF JAPAN 4 (1983) (The
pre-war Meiji government bestowed various favors on the zaibatsu, including transfer-
ring government owned properties and businesses to them.).
58 Id.
59 Id.
11 E. HAHN, JAPANESE BUSINESS LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 131 (1984).
1 E. HADLEY, ANTITRUST IN JAPAN 12 (1970).
'2 Hiroshi, supra note 17, at 56.
63 Note, supra note 17, at 1066 (citing Art. 8 which empowered the FTC to order
businesses to divest a part of their operation whenever "'undue substantial disparities
in bargaining power exist' without regard to any abuse of that power.").
" Id. at 1065-66; see also Sanekata, supra note 14, at 381 ("The principles of
competition policy - that is, the principles of competitive selection and individual re-
sponsibility for business enterprise - have never been widely accepted in Japanese
business society.").
" IYORI & UESUGI, supra'note 57, at 7 (The laws were viewed as punishment
inflicted by the Occupational Forces.).
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types of cartels from the regulation."6
3.1. Japanese Governmental Structure and Response to Keiretsu
As previously noted, Japanese political and social attitudes after
the country's opening in 1867 fostered an unusually high level of coop-
eration between government and business.6 7 This attitude is still re-
flected in the internal structure of the government which is composed of
elected politicians (Diet), big business (the Federation of Economic Or-
ganizations or Keiranden) and the upper echelons of the bureaucracy.
These groups are charged with the responsibility of reaching consensus
on the most effective ways to better the nation. Despite their articulated
altruism, they also work towards admittedly self-serving goals."' The
system has made the politicians dependent on both the bureaucracy and
big business. The former dependence is based on the bureaucrats' lon-
gevity and political power.6 9 Similarly, the latter dependence derives
from the need for campaign contributions. This dependency is so strong
that the head of the Keiranden is called the prime minister of Japan's
invisible government.7 ° The bureaucracy and the Keiranden cooperate
closely, the former often consulting with the latter on proposed govern-
ment actions in order to facilitate consensus.71 Since its inception, the
government has nurtured such cooperation by providing guidance,
planning, and technical and financial assistance to the nation's develop-
ing industries.7 2 Consequently, the Japanese perceive this closeness to
be benevolent. This attitude reflects Japan's belief that the consumer is
industrial growth's ultimate beneficiary."
The Japanese government's fundamental rejection of the notion
66 Nakazawa & Weiss, The Legal Cartels of Japan, 34 ANTrrRusT BULL. 641
(Fall 1989).
67 Hiroshi, supra note 17 at 59-60; see also Hearing, supra note 4 (Deputy
USTR S. Linn Williams stating that Japan controls the interest rates on bank deposits
to below one percent and restricts capital spending on its infrastructure in order to give
Japanese companies the benefit of lower cost of capital.)." See HAHN, supra note 60, at 113-14.
69 Id. at 114.
70 Id.
71 Id.
7'2 Hiroshi, supra note 17, at 59-60.
73 Id. at 60 (The author explains that the society's attitude towards business af-
fects the way the business is allowed to operate. For example, bankruptcy is to be
avoided at all costs, and if a major firm (or a large number of smaller firms) goes
bankrupt, the Diet holds the officials from the industrial ministries responsible. Busi-
nesses are regarded as communities providing life-time employment and supporting de-
pendent sub-contractors; not simply as vehicles of commerce. Therefore, during reces-
sions it is not uncommon for businesses to form recession cartels, with support from
both labor unions and the government.).
1991]
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that consumers benefit from the enhanced competition engendered by a
tough antitrust policy comports with the foregoing ideology. Addition-
ally, the government regards industrial promotion as paramount in ulti-
mately delivering the benefit.74 This tension between antitrust policy
and promoting industry has resulted in, what Western observers deem
to be, an anti-competitive environment.
75
The Japanese government, through the Antitrust Act, established
an independent regulatory agency, the Japanese Fair Trade Commis-
sion (JFTC), to effectuate the nation's antitrust policy.7 6 The JFTC,
modeled after the American Federal Trade Commission, was devised to
counterbalance the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI), the foremost advocate of anti-competitive industrial policy.
77
The creation of an independent, adversarial agency was, for Japan, an
unprecedented move which lacked political support.78 In fact, Japan's
anti-monopoly laws, which have only been actively enforced since the
mid-1960s, did not initially interfere with industrial policy. Though
the tensions between antitrust and industrial growth policies continue,
71 See Hiroshi, supra note 17, at 56-57; Tanaka and Middleton, supra note 25, at
420-21 (footnotes omitted) have contrasted the difference in philosophies:
[T]he [United States] government offers little help to mature industries
suffering from, or threatened with, depressed conditions. What little help
is offered is often fragmented and uncoordinated. Despite the widely-ac-
knowledged need to shift resources from low-growth, technologically back-
ward industries, which consume high ratios of labor, materials and energy,
into high-growth, high-technology and information-intensive industries,
which will provide the jobs and economic leadership of the future, govern-
ment support for these leading edge industries is largely confined to de-
fense procurement and assistance to defense-oriented and non-fossil fuel
energy research and development.
The Japanese government's approach to these issues is rooted in its
own traditions and decision-making process, strives for consensus and per-
mits a higher degree of government participation in the economy. Japan's
approach tends to be more comprehensive than that of the United States.
Japan provides "positive adjustment" through macroeconomic "indicative
planning" and microeconomic industrial policy. Industry problems and
potential, whether related to import competition, loss of comparative ad-
vantage, or the needs of an infant industry, are dealt with in their totality.
Imports are not singled out as the sole factor to receive government
attention.
7 See Hiroshi, supra note 17, at 59.
7' See Note, supra note 17, at 1066-67.
77 Sanekata, supra note 14, at 380.
78 Note, supra note 17, at 1067-68 (The 1953 amendments also "substituted a
balancing test similar to the American 'Rule of Reason'" for the Act's per se standards
which effectively gave MITI a political victory over the newly formed JFTO.).
70 Sanekata, supra note 14, at 391-92 (Early enforcement against cartel practices
was limited to consumer goods industries such as sushi restaurants and tofu (bean curd)
manufacturers and not against big business cartels.).
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the latter policy has clearly prevailed over antitrust enforcement.8
One reason for the failed attempts at effective antitrust enforce-
ment is the flawed mechanism for appointing JFTC Commissioners, a
mechanism which ensures that the appointees will be pro-industry. The
appointments adhere to a tacit rule that the five Commissioners should
be selected, one each, from the Ministry of Finance (MOF), MITI,
and the Ministry of Justice, while the other two are usually former
members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Bank of Japan:8
"[t]hough in the early days several judges, lawyers and law professors
were appointed to the [J]FTC, [as of 1983] no such professional has
become a Commissioner since 1952. ''82 Other key positions, including
the post of Secretary General, are now "reserved" for officials tempora-
rily transferred from the MOF.83 The predominance of industry-sym-
pathetic members has permitted the JFTC to approach MITI in a con-
ciliatory rather than adversarial manner.84 Commentators refer to the
JFTC's historic impotence, at least during the period between its in-
ception and 1974, as a "history of humiliation.
85
3.2. JFTC Authorization of Cartels
In a departure from the American model, the 1953 amendment
empowered the JFTC to participate in authorizing industry cartels.
8 6
This enabled the JFTC to approve the formation of recession cartels,
rationalization cartels, small and medium business cartels, import car-
tels, export cartels and special legislative cartels.
8 7
Recession cartels may be authorized so that industries faced with
the short term problems of a recession can avoid price cutting. 8 This
type of cartel will be approved if the product's price has fallen below
the average cost of production, and a considerable number of manufac-
turers may be forced to close due to the extreme disequilibrium in the
80 Id. at 379.
" Yoshikawa, Fair Trade Commission vs. MITI: History of the Conflicts Between
the Antimonopoly Policy and the Industrial Policy in the Post War Period of Japan,
15 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 489, 497 (1983).
82 Id.
83 Id. (The Secretary General is a top official second only to the Commissioners.).
8 Id.
88 Id. at 495; see also Hearing, supra note 18 (Mr. Ahearn testifying that rather
than "restricting monopolies and other abuses of market power, the Fair Trade Com-
mission tends to concentrate on regulating various kinds of sales promotions, such as
coupons and service discounts.").
S8 JAPAN INDUSTRY SERIES, JAPAN ANTIMONOPOLY POLICY IN LEGISLATIVE
AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE A.35, 17 (1968) (Article 24-(3) authorizes the forma-
tion of cartels in industries affected by depression conditions.).
87 Nakazawa & Weiss, supra note 66, at 641, 642, 649.
88 Id. at 641, 643; see also IYORI & UESuGI, supra note 57, at § 24-3.
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supply of and demand for the product."9
Rationalization cartels are the "concerted activities of producers..
[for the purpose of] effecting an advancement of technology, an im-
provement in the quality of goods, a reduction in costs, an increase in
efficiency and any other rationalization of enterprises." 0 Rationaliza-
tion cartels allow "collusive activity for the purposes of improving in-
dustrial technology, using or buying products, sharing transportation
facilities and otherwise improving efficiency."91
The JFTC may exempt other types of cartels from the Antimono-
poly Act by enacting "bypass statutes."92 Such exemptions have in-
cluded cartels for small and medium businesses, cartels to avoid exces-
sive competition in import and export industries, and cartels formed for
enterprise rationalization.93 The procedure for obtaining JFTC ap-
proval to legitimize new cartels created under a bypass statute is not
rigorous. The companies need only apply to the ministry in charge of
their particular industry, then the ministry consults or notifies the
JFTC regarding its approval of the cartel.94 The approval of 19,762
cartels formed under bypass statutes during the period from 1953 to
1982 compared to 265 under the prior anti-monopoly laws, evinces the
ease with which JFTC approval was obtained during that period.
95
In 1982, an American machine tools manufacturer petitioned the
United States government to restrict the importation of Japanese prod-
ucts because "'the Japanese government instigated the formation of...
[a] cartel and continues to shield its members from competition.' "98
The manufacturer contended - and supported with ample documenta-
tion - that Japan had exempted its machine tools industry from the
antitrust laws in order to rationalize that industry.9 7 Under the ration-
alization plan the government ordered all firms having less than five
8 Hiroshi, supra note 17, at 79.
*0 IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 57, at § 24-4.
*x Note, supra note 17, at 1070; see also IYORI & UEsuGI, supra note 57, at §
24-4.
9' Yoshikawa, supra note 81, at 492.
Id. (In 1983 there were 28 such bypass statutes in effect.).
" See id. at 493 (More cartels have been formed under the bypass statutes than
under the Act's exemption provisions.).
11 Id. (citing KOSEI ToRrrIKi IINKAI (FTC) 1982 KosEI TORIHIKI IINKAI NENJI
HOKOKU (ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FAIR TRADE COMMISSION) 308-310-315).
"6 Googins & Greene, The Industrial Targeting Practices of Japan and the Do-
mestic Machine Tool Industry, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 469, 477 (1983) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Houdaille Industries Inc., Petition to the President of the United
States Through the Office of the United States Trade Representative for the Exercise of
Presidential Discretion Authorized by Section 103 of the Revenue Act of 1971 (May
3, 1982), at 2 [hereinafter Houdaille Industries Inc.]).
17 See id., at 477-78.
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percent of the Japanese market and receiving less than 20% of the
firm's revenue from machine tools to stop production. 8 The govern-
ment further supported the industry cartel by providing concessionary
loans and subsidies.99
The reduction in the percentage of manufacturing shipments is in-
dicative of the diminshing power of legal cartels. According to one com-
mentator, legal cartels produced 28% of Japan's manufacturing ship-
ments in 1963, 18% in 1973 and less than 10% in 1989.100 Yet, these
figures may be misleading because they do not reflect illegal cartel pro-
duction, in fact, they completely ignore the effects of the replacement of
legal cartels by illegal ones. °10 In fact, the decline in the actual number
of authorized cartels is partially attributable to increasing cartel consol-
idation - cartels having more members or greater industrial output.'0 2
Other factors which may contribute to the deceptive statistical de-
cline of legal cartels are the economic climate of the mid 1980s and
unrecorded government assistance. During times of an expanding econ-
omy businesses do not seek protection from competition." 3 Alternately,
during a recession these businesses are more likely to seek government
intervention or refuge in an industry cartel.10 4 That no new recession
cartels were authorized in the period between 1982 and 1987 may be a
deceptive statistic for two reasons. The first is the relative health of the
economy during those years. The second concerns the method of count-
ing such cartels - this category of recession cartels does not include the
Diet-created special legislative cartels formed to help depressed indus-
tries.1 05 Nor does it factor in the effects of MITI's administrative
guidance.
3.3. Market Restriction of MITI's Administrative Guidance
Almost since its inception, MITI has been a key player in Japan's
economic development.'0 The government, through agencies such as
MITI, implements a plan to develop national, industrial, monetary,
and fiscal policies which channel investment and growth to expedite
s Id. (quoting Houdaille Industries, Inc., supra note 96, at 4).
" Id. (quoting Houdaille Industries, Inc., supra note 96, at 7) (Presumably, the
subsidy funds were generated from the business of wagering on bicycle and motorcycle
races in Japan.).
0 Nakazawa & Weiss, supra note 66, at 643.
101 Id.
102 HAHN, supra note 60, at 113, 140.
10s Sanekata, supra note 14, at 385.
104 Id. at 381.
105 Nakazawa & Weiss, supra note 66, at 644.
106 Yoshikawa, supra note 81, at 493.
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achieving long range national objectives.10 MITI consults representa-
tives of government, industry, labor, and academia in drafting these ten
year plans, or "MITI Visions."' 8
MITI advocates policies favoring business, a position which is
concordant with their articulated objective: "to protect, modernize, and
promote the development of Japanese industry as a whole, [as a result
of which] their programs and policies tend to further industrial cooper-
ation and concentration and to focus on trade associations and major
enterprises rather than fostering competition."' 0 9 In keeping with this
anti-competitive ideology, MITI uses administrative guidance to ac-
tively encourage cartel formation. For example, in an effort to realize
its industrial policies, MITI may assist the targeted industry by con-
trolling production levels, approving monopolies aid intervening in
pricing by, inter alia, standardizing or otherwise directly controlling
price.110 In industries with long term problems of competitiveness,
MITI has resorted to "scrapping excess capacity, modernization of pro-
duction processes, or . . . 'reduction of capacity. . .' """
MITI's administrative guidance is usually provided in response to
an industry's request for help. This guidance typically involves analyz-
ing the situation and offering a solution to the industry leaders.112
MITI's guiding policy mirrors the industrial rationalization policy of
1931 which cartelized all major industries to eliminate excessive compe-
tition." 3 Administrative guidance is informal and usually without any
statutory authorization." 4 Routine solutions include remedies such as
reduction of total industry output," 5 plant closing, mergers, industry
cooperation, and government and business cooperation." 6
Although compliance with MITI's recommendations was suppos-
edly voluntary, MITI may utilize various economic weapons to coerce
107 Tanaka & Middleton, supra note 25, at 434 (citing REPORT BY THE COMP-
TROLLER GENERAL TO THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE UNITED STATES CON-
GRESS, INDUSTRIAL POLICY: JAPAN'S FLEXIBLE APPROACH, GAO/10-82-32 (June
23, 1982), at 73 [hereinafter GAO INDUSTRIAL POLICY REPORT]).
108 Id.
109 Hiroshi, supra note 17, at 56.
110 Adams & Ichimura, Industrial Policy in Japan, in INDUSTRIAL POLICIES FOR
GROWTH AND COMPETITIVENESS: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 307, 319 (Adims &
Klein eds. 1984) (Other actions include requiring official permits or certificates for new
entries into the market, regulating the amount of fixed investment, giving subsidies, and
assuring, through the Bank of Japan, that funds are available if required.).
" Tanaka & Middleton, supra note 25, at 435-36 (quoting GAO INDUSTRIAL
POLICY REPORT, supra note 107, at 73).
112 Nakazawa & Weiss, supra note 66, at 642.
118 Hiroshi, supra note 17, at 57.
114 HAHN, supra note 60, at 113.
"a Nakazawa & Weiss, supra note 66, at 642.
110 Hiroshi, supra note 17, at 58.
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recalcitrant companies into compliance. 117 In 1952, when a company
refused to comply with MITI's recommendations, MITI threatened to
curtail production at the company's spinning mills by reducing the
company's import quotas for raw materials.118 That incident is an
anomaly as companies generally willingly comply with MITI recom-
mendations because, in addition to the undesirability of MITI sanc-
tions, the companies generally benefit from cartelization 1 9
MITI's seeming omnipotence became manifest in 1969 through a
case in which the court condemned a MITI trade restriction. MITI
characterized the court's decision as incorrect and, consequently, re-
fused to alter its actions. 20 The Petroleum Production Case, however,
only slightly limited MITI's influence. In that case, the courts ruled
that industry agreements in compliance with a MITI directive could
still be declared illegal.121 This holding should not, however, be read
too broadly as the penalties for compliance with an illegal MITI direc-
tive are mild and the chance of prosecution is small.1 22 The JFTC and
the courts have maintained that cartels formed to implement MITI rec-
ommendations for output restriction or pricing control are illegal even
though the advice was given to the individual companies or their trade
associations.1 23 This position, however, is also not as stringent as it ap-
pears since activities "expressly authorized by the statute, [and] mea-
sures based on a statute, such as setting standard prices or establishing
plant capacity plans, are not in themselves antitrust violations...,,114
In addition, adherence to MITI guidance designed to increase market
concentration or adjust profits among firms by promoting the formation
of joint sales companies or restricting market entry may not violate the
law because the result may not substantially restrain competition.
1 25
The Japanese government's active role in promoting monopoly
and cartel activities or in exempting such practices from their own anti-
monopoly laws, has made it difficult for the United States to protect its
interests through American antitrust laws.1 28 For example, in In re
117 Id. at 71.
115 Yoshikawa, supra note 81, at 494.
119 Id.
120 HAHN, supra note 60, at 121.
'-1 Nakazawa & Weiss, supra note 66, at 642.
121 Fair Trade Commission Plans Tough Stance on Illegal, Restrictive Business
Practices, Int'l Trade Rep., (BNA) No. 7, at 229 (February 14, 1990) [hereinafter
Fair Trade] (The FTC has only issued warnings and has never severely punished
violating cartels.).
1"I Hiroshi, supra note 17, at 69-70 (In 1981 the FTC demanded that the indus-
trial ministries cease this type of administrative guidance.).
124 Id. at 70.
125 Id.
"' Fugate, supra note 15, at 524.
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Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig. 27 the defendant Japanese com-
panies based their defense on the "act of state doctrine" which pre-
cludes American courts from adjudicating the legality of an act if that
act occurred within a foreign nation's borders and was the public act of
an authority exercising sovereign power.12 The Japanese cartel's suc-
cessful use of this doctrine inequitably handicaps competitors in the
American market.
3.4. Cross Shareholding and Interlocking Directors
The Antimonopoly Act prohibits cross shareholding or interlock-
ing directors when such activity "substantially restrain[s] competition in
any particular field of trade."12 This provision was intended to per-
form a check on the traditional keiretsu and is appropriate to the tradi-
tional keiretsu's structure. The keiretsu generally takes the form of a
"one set principle" - with a financial institution at the helm and vari-
ous companies representing all levels of trade comprising the member-
ship.130 While the prohibition on acquiring stock applies to a company
or group of companies, ownership of stock in a competing company
does not per se violate the regulation.' The determinative condition,
"substantially restrain[ing] competition in any particular field of
trade," is met "if there is a probability to effect market control.
1 32
Holding companies, those whose primary business is controlling
other companies through stock ownership, are strictly prohibited re-
gardless of size. 33 The regulations specify that large companies, with
paid-in capital equal to or exceeding 10 billion yen or with net assets
equal to or exceeding 30 billion yen, are prohibited from acquiring the
stock of other companies in excess of their own capital or net assets'
34
12 388 F. Supp. 565 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975), rev'd, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983); see
also HAHN, supra note 60, at 123 and accompanying notes 41-43 (American television
manufacturers sued several Japanese television manufacturers for alleged violations of
United States antitrust laws.).
128 Id. (MITI, testifying in support of the defendants, stated that it had directed
the manufacturers to fix minimum prices for export and had also supervised the prepa-
ration and implementation of the agreement.).
129 IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 57, at 81 (citing §§ 10, 14, 13).
.30 Anchordoguy, A Brief History of Japan's Keiretsu, HARV. Bus. REv. 58-59
(July - Aug. 1990) (The keiretsu have a tendency to include a company in each major
industry in its group.).
13' IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 57, at 81.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 79 (citing § 9) (This measure was designed to combat a conglomerate
combine zaibatsu.).
134 Id. at 79-81 (citing § 9-2) (Various kinds of stock are exempt from this regula-
tion including "stock of companies whose business is undertaken outside Japan, or
which engage in investmentbusiness in foreign countries; companies whose business is
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and financial companies are prohibited from acquiring more than a five
percent interest in another company."3 5
The modern keiretsu controls its member firms through cross
shareholding, loan and credit leverage and the inter-company transfer
of key officers. An example of a modern keiretsu, the Mitsubishi group,
a combine of 171 diverse firms, accounts for almost three percent of the
total final sales in the Japanese economy and controls the companies of
the group through cross shareholding and loan and financing agree-
ments.'36 A recent study revealed that, on average, in 1981 each mem-
ber firm in the keiretsu held between one and a half and two percent of
another member firm's stock. The same study found that the average
percentage of stock held by all keiretsu members was approximately
32%."" This substantial ownership interest exerts significant control in
light of the fact that a company can be a major shareholder in a typical
large corporation with numerous shareholdings by holding only five
percent of that company's stock."8'
Japanese businesses appear to frequently rely heavily on bank
capital rather than equity capital for their corporate capital.' This
creates a situation where credit becomes an important tool in control-
ling the keiretsu members as the keiretsu's member bank usually satis-
fies the requirements for credit.'4 Because each keiretsu bank would
accommodate the firms within its group before serving any outside
firms, the member firms face limited sources of capital, increased de-
pendence on the keiretsu bank and strengthened keiretsu control of
their firms. The Antimonopoly Act does not regulate this method of
control, a method which may be more powerful than cross share
holding.'"
Another form of keiretsu control is interlocking directorships.
These exist when an officer or employee of a company simultaneously
acts as an officer in another Japanese company.' 42 The original Act
prohibited interlocking directorships between competitors, but a 1953
related to development requiring particularly large amounts of capital.").
135 Id. at 79, 84 (citing § 11) (Larger holdings are permitted under certain cir-
cumstances or with JFTC approval.).
136 Hearing, supra note 4.
137 Hiroshi, supra note 17, at 64; but see id. at 64-65 (While the capability to
control the member firm is there, the member firm need not comply with the keiretsu
objective if it is too burdensome.).
138 HADLEY, supra note 61, at 241.
139 Id. at 219.
140 Id.
141 See generally id. at 219-35.
142 Id. at 82.
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amendment removed this restriction. 4 Therefore, the only prohibition
against officers simultaneously serving for competitors is the aforemen-
tioned statutory standard prohibiting companies from "substantially re-
strain[ing] competition." Companies used to circumvent the former re-
striction by transferring key employees and officers between member
companies thereby effectively interlocking directors without the appear-
ance of simultaneous office holding within the companies.
1 "
3.5. The Limited Success of Private Damage Suits
The successful semi-privatization of antitrust law enforcement in
the United States has established such law as a necessary means of
governing corporate behavior. Conversely, in Japan, where the few pri-
vate antitrust actions brought are uniformly unsuccessful, antitrust law
is a regulatory scheme that the JFTC ineffectively applies.14"5 Also in
contrast to the American model, compromise and the avoidance of con-
frontation are integral parts of Japanese society and, therefore, major
factors in Japanese antitrust enforcement. 14  This cultural difference
helps explain the disparity in the incidence of private antitrust actions
in the two nations.4 From their enactment "no plaintiff has ever suc-
ceeded in Japan in getting a reimbursement of its damages under either
of the two provisions of Japanese law that permit private rights of ac-
tion for monopolistic acts."' 4' An understanding of why the Japanese
model has neglected to incorporate this essential mechanism of the
American antitrust protoype - the likelihood of prevailing in private
suits - begins with an examination of the present impediments to such
suits.
The limited success of private damage suits' 4 9 is partially due to
the evidentiary requirements for proving a violation. The first of these
requirements is a JFTC decision which takes the form of a final rec-
ommendation, a consent decision, a contested decision or a final
surcharge order. 50 In order to prevail, the plaintiff must show that the
cartel has "substantially restrained competition in a particular field of
143 Id.
"I See Hearing May 3, supra note 13 (Mr. Pickens testimony discussing
Toyota's practice of transferring their long term employees to fill the CEO, comptroller
and vice president positions at a keiretsu member auto parts manufacturing concern.).
145 Hiroshi, supra note 17, at 62.
14 Sanekata, supra note 14 at, 381-2.
147 Id.
148 Hearing, supra note 4.
140 See Sanekata, supra note 14, at 396 (Only one of the consumer suits has been
successful.).
150 Haley, Antitrust Sanctions and Remedies: A Comparative Study of German
and Japanese Law, 59 WASH. L. REv. 471, 501-2 (1984).
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trade. '151 But a substantial restraint alone is insufficient. Article 3 of
the revised Antimonopoly Act, which prohibits companies from unrea-
sonably restraining trade, requires proof that the parties also "commu-
nicated their intentions to each other; that they acted in a parallel fash-
ion; and that the restrictions imposed by the cartel applied to all cartel
members, a requirement that makes only horizontal agreements ille-
gal."1 52 Article 25, which sets out the basis for damage claims, further
insulates defendants by limiting the parties who may be held liable to
damage claims to individual companies. This means that the trade as-
sociations themselves cannot be sued. 15 The plaintiff must also prove
that illegal cartels were the cause of the price levels during the time
period in question 54 and what the market price of the product would
have been absent the defendant's interference." 5'
The lack of sufficient incentive for overcoming all of these obsta-
cles further chills the likelihood of bringing a private action - the suc-
cessful plaintiff can usually look forward to only a nominal award for
personal damages.1 56 The amount of the damage claim is necessarily
limited because there are no legal provisions for class action damage
suits in Japan.15 7 The promise of low monetary return forces the pri-
vate suit plaintiff to find financial support from a consumer organiza-
tion and/or lawyers who will volunteer their services.55 The inade-
quacy of the potential recovery in these suits is perhaps the greatest
departure from the American model which is propelled by its reward of
treble damages for those private suit plaintiffs who succeed in perform-
ing this social watchdog function. 59 The absence of a similar provision
under Japanese law combined with the aforementioned obstacles to fos-
ter the cultural desire of Japanese businesses to avoid disrupting "close
and intricate business relationships with their competitors" and/or cus-
tomers, to effectively preclude the bringing, and consequently, the suc-
11 JAPAN INDUSTRY SERIES, supra note 86, at 6.
I Note, supra note 17, at 1069. (This section describes the evidentiary require-
ments of Art. 3's prohibition of private monopolization and unreasonable restraint of
trade); see also IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 57, at 217-218.
15 Haley, supra note 150, at 501.
154 Sanekata, supra note 14, at 397.
15' Haley, supra note 150, at 502-3 (A suit failed because the plaintiff could not
establish what the retail price of televisions would have been without the defendant's
illegal activities.).
256 Sanekata, supra note 14, at 396.
125 HAHN, supra note 60, at 132-33.
"S Hearing, supra note 4 (S. Linn Williams, Deputy USTR, stating that a
plaintiff in a kerosene price fixing case was denied damages despite the fact that the
FTC had found the existence of a price-fixing cartel.).
159 HAHN, supra note 60, at 132.
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cess, of such suits."' 0
The systemic inadequacy of private party remediation is a prime
manifestation of Japan's poor antitrust enforcement effort. Conversely,
the American private right of action, independent of any discretionary
ruling by a bureaucrat, 61 is at the heart of America's more effective
antitrust enforcement.
1 62
3.6. The Inadequacy of Penalties for Antitrust Violations
3.6.1. JFTC Investigations and Surcharges
The 1977 amendments to the antitrust laws require that the
JFTC impose a surcharge following any investigation in which it finds
a business to have participated in an illegal cartel which has affected
prices by controlling output.16 3 Prior to these amendments the main
response to such conduct was the issuance of a cease and desist order."64
The slightly more effective surcharge ranges from one half to two per-
cent of the revenue from goods or services subject to the cartel during
the time that the cartel was in effect.165 The penalty is not intended to
be punitive, instead, its purpose is to assess the violator for the amount
of illegal profits gained from the cartel in order to make its operation
unprofitable. 6 The penalty may be inadequate in the case of aggres-
sive cartels.6 and is considerably less than the treble damages assessed
in the United States system. 68 Despite these flaws, it seems to have
been effective in deterring potential recidivists.' 69 The decrease in re-
peat offenders, however, may also be attributed to a separate JFTC
practice. The JFTC handles many investigations but few of these
culminate in formal proceedings? °0 These informal investigations yield
a large number of informal warnings, which the culprits seldom dispute
160 Haley, supra note 150, at 50.
"' Hearing Apr. 19, supra note 13.
162 Id.
163 Hiroshi, supra note 17, at 81.
16 Sanekata, supra note 14, at 346.
169 Hiroshi, supra note 17, at 81 (citing Art. 7-2, 8-3 of the amendments to the
Antimonopoly Act).
16 Note, supra note 17, at 1082.
167 Hearing, supra note 4 (S. Linn Williams stating that the fine the JFTC im-
posed on Japanese companies involved in bid rigging for projects at the Yokosuka Na-
val Base and at the Kansai Airport "was substantially less than the profits they had
made from their illegal acts.").
"'6 Fair Trade, supra note 122 (The Chairman of Japan's FTC acknowledges
that American law provides tougher penalties.).
6 9 Sanekata, supra note 14, at 397.
1 0 Haley, supra note 150, at 506-7 ("Several thousand complaints are made to
the Japanese FTC each year. Hardly more than 500 are fully investigated. Of these no
more than a handful result in formal decisions.").
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because accepting such warning avoids formal sanctions such as the
surcharge.1"1
The Tokyo High Court has further hampered JFTC enforcement
by holding that the Antimonopoly Act only applies to collusion between
businesses and not to individual businesses acting on MITI's instruc-
tions." 2 This holding permits MITI to allow businesses to circumvent
the law by simply advising each business entity separately. When a
trade association is charged with functioning as an illegal cartel under
Article 8, however, this holding is of little value to defendants. The
evidentiary burden in such a case is less stringent than it is for Article 3
cases brought against individual companies, since Article 8 provides a
presumption of communication of intent. 7 This eliminates the loop-
hole of individual MITI counselling in this context. This benefit is,
however, somewhat offset by the insulation granted to the individual
member firms as the JFTC may only prosecute the trade association
itself." 4
3.6.2. Criminal Sanctions Under the Antimonopoly Law
The provision for criminal penalties has only been used two
times," 5 the last of which was in 1974. 17 Despite the literal availabil-
ity of criminal sanctions, this recourse is inadequate because of the dif-
ficulty in proving the criminal conduct and insurmountable odds of pre-
vailing in such an action. 11 These sanctions are rendered even more
futile by their leniency,1 78 despite the fact that the penalties were raised
ten-fold in 1977. Accordingly, they provide little if any deterrence:1"
"[o]ne need not wonder why foreigners believe that Japanese compa-
nies collude and have every reason to continue to collude. Collusion in
Japan is profitable and the bill is paid by foreign companies in the
form of lost business, and by Japanese consumers in the form of higher
prices.' "1
171 Sanekata, supra note 14, at 397-98.
172 Note, supra note 17, at 1079.
170 Id. at 1069.
174 Id. at 1069-70.
175 Sanekata, supra note 14, at 396 (The most recent criminal proceeding was a
1974 action against a petroleum cartel.).
176 See, e.g., Hiroshi, supra note 17, at 66.
177 Sanekata, supra note 14, at 396.
178 Haley, supra note 150, at 483 (The maximum monetary fines start at two
million yen. Maximum jail terms range from one to three years.).
179 Id.
1"0 Hearing, supra note 4.
1991]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
4. SII's IMPACT ON KEIRETSU AND EXCLUSIONARY BUSINESS
PRACTICES
SII's broad and ambitious proposals commit the Japanese govern-
ment to changes in Japan's savings rate, product distribution system,
land use policies, interlocking business relationships, and pricing poli-
cies.""1 The United States' commitments affect its saving and invest-
ment patterns, antitrust reform, product liability laws, export deregula-
tion, government support of research and development, export
promotion, and work force education and training."8 ' This discussion
will concentrate on the sections and clauses of the Japanese commit-
ments that directly affect the existing keiretsu and exclusionary busi-
ness practices.
The Japanese government has made commitments to:
1) Enhance and increase enforcement of the Antimonopoly Act by im-
plementing mechanisms which will:
a) Require the JFTC to expand and enhance its investiga-
tory function and increase its proof-collecting capacity
against illegal activities. The JFTC will especially target
price cartels, supply restraint cartels, market allocations, and
group boycotts."8"
b) Increase budgetary allocation to expand the number of
personnel involved in violation detection and investigative
functions.
184
c) Raise surcharges against cartels in order to deter
violations.185
d) Increase the use of criminal penalties for vicious and seri-
ous cases that impact on people's livelihoods and for repeat
offenders. In conjunction with this policy the Minister of
Justice has publicly requested all the chief prosecutors to co-
operate with the JFTC by making available any information
they may have uncovered relating to violations of the An-
timonopoly Act. The chief prosecutors must also make spe-
cial efforts to "vigorously pursue" cases of criminal violation
of the Antimonopoly Act."'8
8 CooPuR, supra note 3, at CRS-1.
1 Key Elements of U.S.-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative Report Re-
leased by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative on June 28, 1990, 59 Airri-
TRUST & TRADE RE'. 28 (July 5, 1990).
283 SII, supra note 4, at IV-2.
184 Id. at IV-3.
185 Id.
188 Id. at IV-4-5. See also Japan to Revise Penal Code, Ease Consumer Suits as
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e) Increase the effectiveness of the damage remedy system for
individuals provided in Section 25 of the Antimonopoly
Act' 17 by reducing the plaintiffs burden of proof for viola-
tion and damage. The JFTC, when submitting its opinion,
will describe in detail its findings on the violation, the causal
relationship between the violation and damages, the amount
of damages, and the measure used for its calculation. It will
also append any necessary data or materials to its opinion.188
f) Ensure that its administrative guidance "does not restrict
market access or underminefair competition.'
89
2) Minimize the use of exemptions from the general rules of the An-
timonopoly Act and review existing exemptions to ensure that they en-
hance competition and do not impede imports.1 90
3) Take steps to loosen keiretsu (a network of formal and informal
agreements between companies in a vertical supply relationships that
can "promote preferential group trade, negatively affect foreign direct
Part of SI1 Implementation Plan, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 906 (June 20,
1990) ("[T]o stiffen the application of the law, the Fair Trade Commission will create
a permanent body to work with the Justice Ministry and Public Prosecutor's office to
promote more effective controls on competition-distorting business practices.").
187 IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 57, at 246, 249, 257 (The applicable sections
are:
§25 [Absolute liability]
(1) Any entrepreneur who has effected private monopolization or unrea-
sonable restraint of trade or who has employed unfair business practices
shall be liable to indemnify the person injured.
(2) No entrepreneur may be exempted from the liability as prescribed in
the preceding subsection by proving the non-existence of willfulness or
negligence on his part.
§26 [suit for damages and prescription]
(1) the right to claim for damages as provided for in the preceding section
may not be exercised in court until the decision pursuant to the provisions
of Section 48(4), 53-3 or 54 [informal hearing and recommendation; con-
sent decision; formal hearing and decision] has become final and conclusive
or until the decision pursuant to the provisions of Section 54-2(1) has be-
come final and conclusive in case no decision has been made pursuant to
the provisions above.
§84 [Opinion of Commission on amount of damages]
(1)When a suit for indemnification of damages under the provisions of
Section 25 has been filed, the court shall, without delay, obtain the opin-
ion of the Fair Trade Commission with respect to the amount of damages
caused by such violation as provided for in the said section.).
88 S, supra note 4, at IV-5; see also Japan to Revise Penal Code, supra note
186, at 906 (United States officials prompted Japan to list specific measures in the
agreement for the encouragement of lawsuits by individuals that would enhance the
law's deterrent effect. Existing laws were too rigorous for plaintiffs to prove claims
resulting in only six consumer instituted suits, all of which failed.).
18: SJ, supra note 4, at IV-8.
180 Id. at IV-9.
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investment in Japan, and give rise to anti-competitive business prac-
tices"191), including making a commitment to:
a) Strengthen the JFTC's "monitoring of transactions
among members of the same keiretsu groups with cross-
shareholding ties to determine whether these relationships
impede competition."1 9 The JFTC shall also establish and
publish guidelines for the enforcement of the Antimonopoly
Act against keiretsu type group actions. 9 Violations result-
ing from cross-shareholding will result in the restriction or
divestiture of shares.
1 94
b) Make the keiretsu more open and transparent;'
c) Issue a government policy statement affirming that the
Japanese government will take steps to ensure that keiretsu
relationships do not impede fair competition and at the same
time request the cooperation of the keiretsu firms in achiev-
ing this policy.
1'9 6
Japanese business leaders were "stunned" by SII's unexpectedly
tough agreements to strengthen the antitrust laws and regulate the
keiretsu. These leaders predicted that the reforms would adversely af-
fect economic activities and increase the level of government regulation
in Japan.17 Compared to the American system, SII's provisions do not
seem extraordinary. Rather it is Japan's historic reliance on the
keiretsu and the government's promotion of trade and concomitant deci-
sion to permit exclusionary trade practices that make SII's measures
seem draconian. 9 In the context of the historically ineffective enforce-
ment of the present Antimonopoly Act, however, these provisions would
not necessarily effect any change.
5. PROBABILITY OF SII SuccEss
SII's success depends, in large part, on Japan's resolve to reduce
the trade imbalance. With respect to this imbalance, the United States
191 Key Elements, supra note 182.
192 COOPER, supra note 3, at CRS-11.
193 SII, supra note 4, at 3.
114 Key Elements, supra note 182.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 SII Talks: Now for the Hard Part, supra note 17.
199 Cf Hearing, supra note 18 (Clyde Prestowitz, Senior Associate, Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace, testifying that the United States demands to open the
Japanese market impose a social and political organization which may not be compati-
ble with the Japanese structure, policy and social practices.).
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is most concerned with nations that actively maintain trade surpluses
which increase the trade deficit and impede trade growth.199 Even at
the time SII was being issued, however, Japan's Finance Ministry was
suggesting that the trade imbalance was not as severe as many Ameri-
can observers believed it to be.200 Despite Prime Minister Kaifu's per-
sonal assurances to President Bush that he would turn Japan into an
"import superpower" by enacting the SII's commitments, American of-
ficials have already expressed doubts about Japan's intent to carry out
reforms relating to enhancing antitrust enforcement. 0 1 "Former Dep-
uty U.S. Trade Representative Michael B. Smith dismisses the negotia-
tions as a waste of energy, while another former U.S. Trade official
warns that Washington will again be cheated by Japanese
bureaucrats.
2 o0 2
Despite the rampant skepticism among American observers, those
who are optimistic concerning SII, feel that Japan can successfully
strengthen its antitrust policy, although doing so would require a
change in its economy's emphasis. 203 Japanese economic emphasis and
thought currently depart from the Western model from which Japan's
antitrust laws were fashioned and to which the world wishes Japan to
conform. In the Western system, market capitalism exists to serve con-
sumer desires.204 Alternatively, the Japanese system serves producers,
but not for the benefit of the stockholder. 0 5 The producers are seen as
the "well spring of growth" - an indispensible part of the main goal
of nation building. 0 6
The successful application of American antitrust law may require
"I See Remarks of Ambassador Carla Hills, supra note 1. Cf Fair Trade,
supra note 122 (JFTC Chairman Umezawa believes that reform of the Antimonopoly
Act alone will not help reduce the trade imbalance.).
200 Regional Outlook Blinded by Success, Japan Searches for a New Vision, L.A.
Times, June 19, 1990, at H1, col. 2 (The Finance Ministry contended that the surplus
is benevolent because it allows Japan to finance the American deficit, provide develop-
ment aid for the Third World, and comprise the source of investment funds for Eastern
Europe.).
201 Id. See also Impediments? No Problem, L.A. Times, June 30, 1990, at B6,
col. 1 (This editorial questions whether President Bush or Prime Minister Kaifu will
be able to institute the unpopular domestic policy changes SII requires.).
202 SII Talks: Now for the Hard Part, supra note 17; see also Sanekata, supra
note 14, at 381 (This article asserts that previous antitrust reform was only a politically
expedient step. It goes on to explain that industrial policy will eventually compromise
any progress made.).
203 Hiroshi, supra note 17, at 56.
204 See Blinder, There are Capitalists, Then There are the Japanese, Bus. WK.
Oct. 8, 1990, at 21, col. 2 (The article quotes a top MITI official stating that: "We did
the opposite of what American economists said. We violated all the normal concepts.").
205 Id.
206 Id.
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a change in the "philosophic outlook that provides the framework" for
Japan's market system.20 7 The United States operates on a laissez-faire
philosophy which requires firms to compete for capital and customers
and provides redress for the denial of free competition.2 " Conversely,
because Japan had to marshall all of its scarce raw materials and fi-
nances for optimum use, it has developed a pattern of planning, subsi-
dizing and guiding targeted industries. 0 9 As previously described, Ja-
pan has emphasized industrial growth at the cost of fair and free
competition. Accordingly, a free market system may only be realized
now if the Japanese redirect their goals.
SII's success, therefore, hinges on the Japanese government's abil-
ity to obtain the support of the powerful constituents that these changes
will affect. The Liberal Democrats in Japan "may favor liberalization
and economic reform, but they are nearly powerless to act" because
they have been weakened "by a popular tax revolt and by sex and
fund-raising scandals."'2 0 Any attempt to fortify the antitrust laws will
probably trigger criticism and opposition from politically powerful bus-
iness organizations such as the Keirandren.2 " The Keiranden's criti-
cism of the JFTC and its alliance with the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) have made it a major component of the continuing force to
weaken or, at least prevent any reinforcement of, the antitrust laws.
21 2
It is quite probable that the reforms can only occur if the con-
sumer and the disenfranchised small and mid-sized businesses recognize
the benefits of a strong antitrust policy and support the politicians com-
mitted to change.
213
5.1. Breakup of the Keiretsu
"[V]ery little has been said about U.S. demands to break up Ja-
pan's ... keiretsu, and restrict cross-ownership of stock. 'There's very
little the government can do in that regard,' one Japanese official
said.121 4 This impotence arises because, inter alia, the Antimonopoly
207 Googins & Greene, supra note 96, at 485.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Regional Outlook, supra note 200; see also SlI Talks: Now for the Hard
Part, supra note 17 (Prime Minister Kaifu does not have a strong power base even
within his own political party.).
211 Sanekata, supra note 14, at 385, 388-89 (the Keiranden, or Federation of
Economic Organizations, has advocated weakening the antitrust laws whenever it has
perceived them to have obstructed big business and industrial policy.).
212 Id. at 389-91.
218 Id. at 395 (The support of the consumer and the small- and medium-sized
business was key in passing the 1977 antitrust amendments.).
24 Japan Preparing Array of Trade Concessions; Proposals to Respond to U.S.
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Act does not proscribe vertical monopolies and is inapplicable against
many existing cartels.215
Additional problems may arise because the reforms apparently
lack the requisite support for implementation. While Japanese business
leaders have demonstrated a willingness to institute the reforms, they
maintain that the keiretsu are not harmful and that western businesses
should recognize the economic desirability of establishing long term
business relationships and vertical keiretsu dealings. 216 Similarly, gov-
ernment agencies such as MITI consider the existing structure to be
the most effective way of addressing their concerns which prioritize in-
dustrial development and "the protection and growth of industry" over
all else.21 This policy emphasis translates into a lack of political power
for the JFTC and a lack of political support for augmenting present
antitrust enforcement.
5.2. Stricter Enforcement of Antitrust Laws: An Empty Promise
There is a great difference between the Japanese and American
perceptions of the law's function. Americans view it as protection of
freedom and equality. Alternately, the Japanese see the law primarily
as an "instrument of government control, especially bureaucratic con-
trol." The Japanese perspective, rooted in the cultural institutions of
conducting business by negotiation and compromise, generally regards
"resorting to law and litigation . . . as an undesirable . . . means of
resolving disputes."2 8 This interplay of culture and business is but one
manifestation of the impact of Japanese social custom and non-Wester-
ness on its economic relationships.
The justifications profferred to explain Japan's propensity for
keiretsu and cartels further exemplify this interplay. These justifica-
tions focus on the contention that Japanese society has uniquely non-
western characteristics. One frequently mentioned characteristic is the
"peculiar mentality of preferring cooperation or harmony to competi-
tion. Thus, to do something together with others (even with one's com-
Complaints, Wash. Post, Mar. 20, 1990, at C4.
215 See Note, supra note 17, at 1069.
216 SII Talks: Now for the Hard Part, supra note 17 (Keiranden and Japan
Association of Corporate Executives (Keizai Doyukai) officials stating their willingness
to attempt to conform to international standards, but maintaining that the Japanese
system may be a better business system.) But see Sanekata, supra note 14, at 392-93
("After 1972 an increase in cartels among big businesses in manufacturing industries
resulted in a significant increase in wholesale prices which brought a sharp rise in
consumer prices.").
217 Hiroshi, supra note 17, at 56-57.
218 Id. at 62.
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petitor) is a virtuous deed and is hardly considered a crime."219 Along
the same lines, the government's role in leading the development of the
economy and the acceptance of cartels since 1868, when the country
was first opened to the West, are testament to Japan's quasi-humorous
justification that these are consistent with its aforementioned professed
aversion to cultural relativism in the world financial context.
220
Consistent with a more credible incarnation of this reasoning,
some commentators contend that Japanese industrial policy and mo-
nopolistic practices are deeply rooted in Japan's cultural and sociologi-
cal behavior. This belief, however, may be a current version of the
western image of the inscrutable Japanese. Deputy USTR Williams
argues that the "market access structural practices, exclusionary busi-
ness practices, distribution system and keiretsu are not primarily cul-
tural nor are they uniquely Japanese. They are practices that US or
European companies would probably engage in themselves if the laws
and policies of their countries or of open market economics permitted
them to."
22 '
The main reason for the development and continuation of cartels,
however, is most likely the uniquely Japanese method of business oper-
ation. Labor mobility in Japan is very low as both white and blue
collar workers tend to stay with one employer throughout their ca-
reers.222 This lack of mobility in the closed labor market place imposes
a considerable hardship on the laid off employee. Accordingly, Japa-
nese companies are more reluctant than their American counterparts to
layoff employees. 223 The system of permanent employment and the
high ratio of debt financing increase the manufacturer's fixed costs and
force it to maintain market share.224 Even in a recessionary market the
manufacturers will attempt to maintain previous levels of production,
which can result in cut-throat price competition.225 Government initia-
tive is often taken or private-sector reciprocal agreements are often
made to avoid having to resort to such price competition. 226 The pres-
sure for continued maintenance of the market share is visible in the
predatory pricing schemes that Japanese manufacturers have employed
219 Yoshikawa, supra note 81, at 495.
220 Id.
221 Hearing, supra note 4 (The Under Secretary of Economic and Agricultural
Affairs, U.S. Department of State, shares this opinion. SHI is not an attack on the
culture of Japan, the practices in Japan are basically the same as those that occurred in
the United States in the 1920s.).
222 Yoshikawa, supra note 81, at 496.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id.
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in the consumer electronics and semiconductor industries. The cartel is
the indispensible prerequisite needed to effectuate these schemes and
carry out the government's industrial policies.
6. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
Possible solutions to the trade problem include altering the Ameri-
can system by permitting keiretsu formation to encourage more integral
or horizontal cartels in strategic industries. 227 Any United States effort
to imitate Japanese systems must, however, change the United States'
adherence to the premise that "free trade is the best system for all: It
lowers prices for buyers and helps each nation exploit its comparative
advantage. 22 18 Such alterations would further require the creation of an
implicit American industrial policy 229 with the government directing
the economy and targeting industries for growth. In order for the
United States to adopt the Japanese approach to industrial planning, it
must restructure the elemental relationship between government and
business. This transformation would entail elevating the bureaucracy,
in terms of the prominence of the role it plays and the respect it is
accorded. Such in depth revisions would create a need to cement an
agreement on values and attitudes between government and business."'
This agreement would also necessarily include provisions for overcom-
ing several constitutional hurdles to such a change: "[a]dministrative
guidance ... would be unconstitutional . .. favor[ing] some industries
while urging others to scale down their operations due to their lack of
competitiveness would violate our strict constitutional requirements of.
• . due process. . . . our constitutional system would not tolerate...
government largesse that is available to some companies but not
others."2 ' To completely adopt the Japanese system, the United States
must define itself as a production and export leader and abandon its
basic historic goal of cultivating a consumer protection system.2"2
Though American and European companies already endorse SII's
proposed changes, some feel that there are still many ways in which the
227 See Ferguson, supra note 53, at 68-70.
228 Blinder, supra note 204.
229 Tanaka & Middleton, supra note 25, at 420.
220 See HAHN, supra note 60, at 124.
21 Id. at 125.
232 Cf Hearing, supra note 18 (Clyde Prestowitz's testimony:
[Any country that has an active industrial policy logically has to have
barriers. If you establish it as a matter of national priority to be a leader
in semiconductors ... you will have national policies aimed at achieving
that, and you will not welcome large influxes of foreign products into
those markets.).
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negotiations can further precipitate the advancement of the free market.
While the foregoing suggestions addressed the proposals Japan should
ask the United States to adopt, the following suggestions address altera-
tions for which the United States should negotiate.
The United States should encourage the Japanese government to
alter its attitude regarding the role industry plays in the national wel-
fare. Instead of focusing on the growth of industry as the measure of
the state of the nation, it should also look to the ways in which the
system benefits the consumer. This fundamental change is crucial to the
successful implementation of any structural change in the Japanese
economy.
The United States should also urge Japan to continue strengthen-
ing the JFTC. This agency's diminished political power and prestige,
however, mean that negotiators should follow additional routes to
achieving this goal. The negotiators must also press for weakening and
eventually dismantling MITI and the other government industry pro-
motion agencies. This rescission of agency power should include cur-
tailing the agency's administrative guidance powers and proscribing
government authorization of trade and industry cartels. These changes
are necessary because any prohibition on cartels will lack credibility as
long as some segment of the government continues to engage in these
practices.
The United States should also campaign for amending Japan's
Antimonopoly Act. More stringent provisions should prohibit all forms
of keiretsu control including the use of cross-shareholding, interlocking
directors and the interchange of key officers between competitors and
vertically linked companies. The keiretsu and cartel policies impede fair
competition and result in above market prices in the Japanese market.
As seen earlier, the windfall profits that such predatory activities gener-
ate sustain the predatory practices in the western markets and will
eventually affect the prices to American consumers.
Other major revisions in the Antimonopoly Act should include an
adoption of the American model's provision of a financial incentive to
bring private suits for damages, which has proven to be a most effective
means of enhancing enforcement. The, changes must also provide for
assessing punitive damages and they should enable private individuals
and companies to bring class action suits. There is, at present, abso-
lutely no incentive for private parties to take legal action against anti-
trust violators.
The United States should also independently alter its own anti-
trust law enforcement mechanism. In order to target the keiretsu and
cartel type activities of Japanese companies, the United States must
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eliminate the sovereign power protection afforded those Japanese gov-
ernment directives which foster and encourage cartel activity abroad.
This would legally protect American companies which cannot ade-
quately compete with the American extensions of Japanese cartels -
cartels which are presently insulated from antitrust prosecution.
The way American courts respond to antitrust actions must also
change to acknowledge that Japan's business and government practices
render predatory pricing schemes a viable option for Japanese multina-
tional cartels. These are fundamental steps which must be taken to suc-
cessfully prosecute attempts to increase market share at the expense of
free competition.
7. CONCLUSION
To change the Japanese system in order to create what the West
would deem an effective antitrust enforcement practice, the SII dialogue
must focus on the Japanese government's attitude towards its indus-
tries. This means that the Japanese government must discard its cur-
rent goal of maintaining a trade surplus and abandon its role as a fer-
vent promoter of industry. The trade talks should attempt to recast
policies presently providing for government subsidized or protected in-
dustries. Failing these deletions and additions to Japan's present poli-
cies, it will be extremely difficult to strengthen the laws.
In addition to these policy changes, Japan should eliminate the
protective practice of government authorized cartels and enhance the
prosecution of those that are illegal. This can be accomplished by
stricter enforcement efforts, instituting punitive penalties for violations,
and creating an incentive for private enforcement suits. In order to ef-
fectuate the opening of the Japanese market to competitive pricing Ja-
pan must also enact stricter laws prohibiting vertically integrated mo-
nopolies, forbidding the trading of key corporate officers, and removing
entry restrictions for foreign competitors.
The history of Japanese business and traditional social practices is
unique and distinct from western practices. Japan has been able to cre-
ate a prosperous and thriving industrial nation by helping provide its
companies with access to the world's free market system. It has
achieved this, however, at great cost to consumers and by burdening the
process of forming new enterprises. It would be unfair for Japan to
deny other trading nations the same opportunities that they themselves
have exploited so successfully.
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